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Abstract—We address the detection of process-related threats
in control systems used in critical infrastructures. Process-
related threats take place when an attacker gains user access
rights and performs actions, which look legitimate, but which
are intended to disrupt the industrial process. We use logs
to detect anomalous patterns of user actions on process
control application. A preliminary case study suggests that our
approach is effective in detecting anomalous events that might
alter the regular process workflow.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) are used for controlling
and monitoring industrial processes. Such systems can be
found in critical infrastructures like: power plants and power
grid systems, water, oil and gas distribution systems or
building monitoring (e.g., airports, railway stations).
Although failures in the security or safety of critical
infrastructures could impact people and thus damage in-
dustrial facilities, recent reports state that current critical
infrastructures are not sufficiently protected against cyber
threats. For example, according to Rantala [16], around
2,700 organisations dealing with critical infrastructures in
the U.S. detected 13 million cybercrime incidents, suffered
$288 million of monetary loss and experienced around
150,000 hours of system downtime in 2005.
The increasing number of security incidents in ICS fa-
cilities is mainly due to the combination of technological
and organizational weaknesses. In the past, ICS installa-
tions were separated from public networks, used proprietary
software architectures and communication protocols. Due to
the “security by obscurity” paradigm, the systems were less
vulnerable to cyber attacks. Although keeping a segment of
communication proprietary, ICS vendors nowadays increas-
ingly use common communication protocols and commercial
off-the-shelf software. Also, it is common to deploy remote
connection mechanisms to ease the management during off-
duty hours, and achieve nearly-unmanned operation.
Unfortunately, the stakeholders seldom enforce strong
security policies. User credentials are often shared among
users to ease day-to-day operations and are seldom updated,
resulting in a lack of traceability. For example, a disgruntled
(former) employee whose credentials were still valid has
caused havoc in Queensland, Australia [18].
Due to these reasons, ICS facilities became more vul-
nerable to internal and external cyber attacks. Although
companies reluctantly disclose incidents, there are several
published cases where safety and security of ICS facilities
were seriously endangered [17].
As “regular” computers systems, ICSs are susceptible
to threats exploiting software vulnerabilities (e.g., protocol
implementation, OS vulnerabilities). However, ICS facilities
are also prone to process-related threats. These threats take
place when an attacker using valid credentials performs
actions, which look legitimate, but which are intended to
alter the industrial process(es). Process-related threats also
include situations when system users make an operational
mistake at the application level, e.g, when a user inputs
a wrong value (e.g., a highly oversized value) for a given
device parameter and causes the failure of the process.
Traditional security countermeasures, such as intrusion
detection systems, cannot detect, let alone mitigate, process-
related threats. The anomalies generated by such threats are
typically not reflected in communication patterns/data (e.g.,
injection of executable code to exploit a buffer overflow
sent within network traffic data), and can only be detected
by analysing data passed through the system at a higher
semantic level. To understand the higher semantic level from
network data, a protocol parser has to be used, such as in Bro
[15]. Similarly, for host-based analyses, understanding the
specific ICS application is crucial. At the moment of writing,
there are no ICS protocol parsers publicly available. Thus
we conclude that ICS network traffic cannot provide process
semantic information. Other approaches for monitoring ICS
behaviour include using field measurements or centralised
ICS events as information resources. Field measurements
represent raw values coming from field devices and thus are
semantically too low level to provide an understanding of
user actions. ICS event logs provide a complete, high-level
view on the industrial process, capturing information about
user activities, system changes in the field as well as system
status updates.
Compared to both field measurements and network traffic,
ICS events are more consistent as they represent a standard
ICS output which is very similar in various vendor families.
Therefore, we argue that ICS event logs can provide high
level process information and stakeholders could detect
process-related threats by analysing ICS logs.
Problem: Even an ICS system used in a small installa-
tion generates thousands of potentially alarming log entries
per day. Thus the size (and high dimensionality) of logs
make manual inspection practically infeasible.
This is a relevant and challenging problem to tackle. It
is relevant because process-related threats affect the security
and safety of critical infrastructures, which in turn could
endanger human life. It is challenging because in the past
the analysis of system logs has been applied to other security
domains (e.g., in [10]) but failed to deliver convincing
results. We argue that ICS environments have, compared to
other intranets, a less dynamic character and thus provide
better chances for capturing relevant patterns.
Contributions: The main contributions of this paper are
as follows:
 we propose an approach to detect process-related
threats and build a tool to automate the analysis of
ICS logs, which can be used to detect process-related
threats,
 we have performed experiments to validate our ap-
proach using data from a real industrial installation.
Our tool leverages a well-known data mining algorithm to
enumerate (in)frequent patterns within a given set. Despite
being quite simple and straightforward, our benchmarks
show that the chosen algorithm is effective in detecting
anomalous user actions. We conduct our experiments on a
type of ICS commonly referred to as “SCADA” (Supervi-
sory Control and Data Acquisition). Therefore, in the rest
of the paper we refer to SCADA environments only. These
systems can typically be found in power, water and gas
infrastructures. However, we believe that our approach can
be easily adapted for the other types of ICS as well (e.g.,
distributed control systems - DCS).
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we explain how a typical SCADA system
works. A SCADA system consists of two main domains:
the process field and a control room (Figure 1). Large
Figure 1. SCADA system overview: control room and process field
systems may have more than one control room. The network
Figure 2. SCADA system layered architecture
infrastructure binds the two domains together. SCADA users
control the industrial process from the control room and
are provided with a real-time overview of the process field
device parameters (data about tank loads, pump statuses,
temperatures, etc). Depending on the underlying process,
SCADA systems differ from each other. For example, a
power-related SCADA installation contains power switches
and transformers while a water-related installation contains
water pumps and valves. However, based on interviews
with the stakeholders (who represent process engineers,
operators and computer network experts from two different
facilities), we argue that the computer systems controlling
these processes behave in a similar way and our approach
is thus transferrable between the domains.
System architecture: Despite the fact that there are dif-
ferent vendors, the system architectures in various SCADA
systems are similar and the terminology is interchangeable.
Figure 2 shows a typical SCADA layered architecture. Layer
1 consists of physical field devices, PLCs (Programmable
Logic Controllers) and RTUs (Remote Terminal Units). The
PLCs and RTUs are responsible for controlling the industrial
process, receiving signals from the field devices and sending
notifications to upper layers. Layer 2 consists of SCADA
servers (Connectivity and Aspect Servers, together with a
Domain Controller for user authentication) responsible for
processing data from Layer 1 and presenting process changes
to Layer 3. The various clients in Layer 3 represent SCADA
users.
System users in process control: There are two kinds
of SCADA users: engineers and operators. An engineer is
responsible for managing object libraries and user interfaces,
setting working ranges for devices, defining process set-
points, writing automation scripts, etc. An operator monitors
the system status and reacts to events, such as alarms (e.g.,
by opening a pump, closing a valve), so that the process
runs correctly (Figure 1). Although industrial processes in
various domains differ in the details, the user interaction
with a SCADA system is broadly similar. Our stakeholders
acknowledged that an engineer is a more powerful system
user than an operator (e.g., an engineer writes scripts that
define process automation while operators usually only
run the script). Also, operators perform actions that are
predefined by engineers (e.g., an engineer defines pump
speed range, while an operator works within the range only).
This means that operator actions are security and safety
constrained depending on the way the engineer implemented
safety controls. By contrast, there is no mechanism that will
ensure that engineer actions are safe for the process (e.g., an
engineer can, by mistake, assign a capacity 10 times bigger
than in reality to a tank, and thus shuts tank level alarms
off).
System logs: System logs capture information about
user activity information. Depending on the size of the fa-
cility, a SCADA system records thousands of events per day.
The SCADA logs in different domains are stored in a similar
format consisting of (1) basic attributes such as timestamp,
subject of action, type of action, user and (2) context-specific
attributes such as message description, subtype of action, etc.
We acknowledge that an attacker could manipulate logs by
sending false data to the control application which generates
log (e.g., by controlling a field device) or by deleting existing
log entries. However, these actions would require accessing
higher privileges (and perhaps exploiting a system-related
threat). In general, the most recent part of the logs is
shown on the operator screens. Severe events are highlighted
as alarms. However, alarms typically include only critical
system statuses (e.g., tank level is very low) and cannot
extract a more general view on the system behaviour.
In the next section we describe potential threats that relate
to the user activity in the system.
III. SECURITY THREATS
We classify possible threats in two groups: system- and
process-related. System-related threats typically exploit soft-
ware/configuration vulnerabilities (e.g., a buffer overflow or
a flaw in a communication protocol [4]). Such attacks are
low level and typically occur at Layer 1 and Layer 2 of the
SCADA architecture (Figure 2).
On the other hand, process-related threats exploit weak
process controls, and imply that an attacker obtains (e.g.,
through social engineering) or has user access rights and
issues legitimate SCADA commands to cause defects in
the industrial process. We analyse process-related threats
during a focus group session with stakeholders. Based on
two possible places where a SCADA user can interacts with
the process, we distinguish two types of process-related
threats: (1) threats that leverage access controls on field
devices and (2) threats that leverage vulnerabilities of the
centralised SCADA control application. The first type of
threats typically results in sending bad data to the SCADA
state estimation which can then produce errors in system
state analysis [13]. The second type of threat includes
scenarios of performing legitimate user actions (from the
control application) that can have negative impact on the
Table I
IDENTIFIED PROCESS-RELATED THREATS AND THREAT EXAMPLES IN
THE SYSTEM CONTEXT
Type of threat Threat Example
Scripting error An engineer loads a
script that causes er-
rors in the system au-
tomation
An engineer inserts a
wrong ratio of chemical
components
Misconfiguration
/functional
An engineer modifies
a device parameter
Change capacity of
a tank to prevent the
alarming system from
going off
Misconfiguration
/functional
An engineer modifies
auditing policy
Turn off all auditing
Misconfiguration
/control
An engineer modifies
the range of allowed
actions for a specific
device
A pump cannot be any
longer stopped
Misconfiguration
/control
An engineer modifies
the system topology
Some devices become
invisible, and thus inac-
cessible
process production or devices. In this paper we focus on
the second type of process-related threats. These attacks are
high level (occur via the process control application) and
typically relate to Layer 3 (Figure 2).
A. Identifying process-related threats
Together with the stakeholders we analyse threats that
include user activity in SCADA application control software.
We define user activities as actions that are (1) performed
by a signed-on user or (2) performed on a known user
workstation. We analyse the threats that leverage legitimate
system commands performed by a legitimate user, or by
an illegitimate user who has managed to obtain valid cre-
dentials. Our focus is on the threats that can be triggered
by a single user action (i.e., we do not analyse sequences
of actions). Based on interviews with the stakeholders, we
distinguish two threat scenarios, namely (1) an attacker
impersonates a system user or (2) a legitimate system user
makes an operational mistake.
To identify process-related threats, and the leveraged
vulnerabilities, we analyse a real-life SCADA system con-
trolling a water treatment facility located in the Netherlands.
Table I shows a sample of identified threats. Generally, we
distinguish two types of serious threats: scripting errors and
misconfiguration. Both types of threats typically originate
from the activity of engineers. The threats exploiting a
scripting error imply writing (and loading) faulty process
automation scripts or leveraging scripts already developed
by system engineers. A misconfiguration implies forcing the
settings of unsafe configurations.
A possible way of mitigating these vulnerabilities is to
deploy a tool to analyse data resources from SCADA and
thus detect malicious behaviours.
IV. APPROACH
We propose an approach to detect process-related threats
based on an automated way of processing SCADA logs. Our
goal is to identify the most interesting events from the logs,
and thus allow operators to focus on a set of potentially
suspicious events than can be inspected manually. To this
end we built a tool called MELISSA (Mining Event Logs
for Intrusion in SCADA Systems).
The stakeholders acknowledge that anomalous events can-
not be extracted by performing simple queries on logs. In
general, less than 1% of the total log entries generated
by a SCADA systems directly account for user activities
(i.e., the event performed by a legitimately signed-on user
or on one of the known user workstation). The remaining
entries represent automated system responses which can and
do consist of indirectly related user actions (e.g., system
report on tank level change, communication loss, activation
of a workplace). In practice, only understanding the context
of latter events can help to extract potentially suspicious
user actions. Thus manual analysis is infeasible. Also, a
large amount of entries is timer-triggered (e.g., some events
always appear with the same number of daily occurrences).
Therefore, we believe that a pattern-based analysis of the
system behaviour is suitable for the SCADA context.
The basic idea of our approach is that a frequent be-
haviour, over an extended period of time, is likely to be
normal [3][14]. For example, a repeated error about a miss-
ing device becomes less interesting as time passes (because
operators are supposed to tackle the problem without delay.
If it is ignored, it can be considered as normal behaviour).
By contrast, a rare event, in a semi-automated and stable
environment as SCADA, is likely to be anomalous. For ex-
ample, an engineer operating from a machine that is usually
inactive outside the working hours is considered suspicious.
Our analysis consists of pattern mining on SCADA logs.
We use an algorithm for mining frequent patterns to identify
the most and the least frequent (expected to be anomalous)
patterns of system behaviours. Also, we include the process
knowledge to evaluate the severity of specific log entries on
the process (described in the Implementation section).
To mine logs we translate SCADA log entries into pat-
terns. Figure 3 depicts the relation between a log entry, an
itemset, an item and a pattern. Each unique log entry, with all
attributes, represents a single itemset (Figure 3.A). A unique
value of an attribute in the log entry represents one item. A
support count is the number of log entries that contain the
given itemset. Formally, if the support count of an itemset I
exceeds a predefined minimum support count threshold, then
I is a pattern [8]. In Figure 3, log entries 2 and 3 are the
same, thus the corresponding pattern has the support count
2 (Figure 3.B).
Input data for analysis: We leverage the knowledge of
the stakeholders about their processes to choose the subset
of attributes that is expected to provide the most relevant
information gain for the analysis. We base our selection on
the threats we describe in Section III-A: we need information
about the time at which the event occurs and on which
Figure 3. Log translation: A) mapping log entries into itemsets and items,
B) mapping itemsets into patterns
Table II
EXAMPLE OF A SIMPLIFIED SCADA LOG
W.
shift
Aspect
of action
Type
of action
Object
path
User
account
SCADA
node
2 - ProcessSimple Event - - CS01
2 Layoutchange
Configuration
change
Root/../
layout Engineer1 EN01
1 - Operatoraction
Plant1/
../ tanks Operator2 OP03
system/node, about the user that performed the action and
about the nature of the action. We have performed some
preliminary tests to narrow down the list of potentially in-
teresting attributes, and to eliminate redundant (e.g., user full
name) and unstructured (e.g., object description) attributes.
Our final set consists of 6 nominal attributes: Working
shift, Aspect of action, Type of action, Object path, User
account and SCADA node. A SCADA node represents a com-
puter that sends event details to the log. In our case, there
are 8 different nodes. The attribute Type of action takes one
out of 12 nominal values. This attribute describes the general
type of action, such as: operator action, layout configuration
change, network message, etc. For types of action which
are performed by users, the attribute Aspect of action is
applicable. This attribute takes one out of 6 nominal values
in the log and details the character of the user action, such
as: change of workplace layout, change in workplace profile,
etc. The attribute Object path provides information about the
location of the object device (e.g., main site/street1/tanks).
The attribute User account represents the username of the
signed-on user. Table II represents a sample of the analysed
log.
V. ARCHITECTURE
MELISSA consists of two interacting components: the
Data Preparator (DP) and the Pattern Engine (PE). Figure 4
depicts MELISSA and its internal components.
Figure 4. MELISSA architecture
Data Preparator: We perform data aggregation (e.g.,
variance reduction) and transformation (e.g., value coding)
on the dataset to get a suitable data format for pattern min-
ing. We describe performed operation in the Implementation
section.
Pattern Engine: The PE first runs the algorithm for
mining frequent patterns over log and outputs an ordered
list of patterns based on the frequency of the occurrence. We
then use the severity weights, defined by the stakeholders, in
combination with the frequency to perform a fine-grained re-
ordering of the output list. This way we differentiate patterns
that occur with the same frequency but may result with
different consequences on the process.
To select the most suitable algorithm for mining frequent
patterns, we identified a list of required features. The re-
quirements are as follows: (1) maximal pattern mining, (2)
scalability, (3) selection of interesting events based on the
absolute support count.
Maximal pattern mining There are different types of
pattern mining (e.g., closed, complete, maximum). An item-
set can be frequent but not (necessarily) interesting and
useful for stakeholders in a specific context. For us, the
stakeholders agreed that no subset of attributes carries
enough semantics to distinguish between anomalous and
normal events. For example, it is not sufficient to describe
an event with only two attributes (e.g., itemset attributes
ftype of action, user accountg; itemset instance fOperator
action, Operator 2g). Therefore, we set a requirement that
the algorithm has to deliver output patterns which consists
of as many attributes as possible. This type of mining is
in the data mining terminology referred as mining maximal
patterns [8]. In our context, a maximal itemset is one log
entry consisting of all applicable log attributes.
Scalability For the cases when the same plant setup is
running for years, we might want to run the tool contin-
uously, and receive events as they occur. Thus, the tool
needs to scale well when processing logs that may consist
of years of plant work. The tool can then leverage the
knowledge of past behaviours to update the top patterns and
detect anomalies. Also, the speed of processing is important
as operators must take immediate action in case of an
alarm. There are two main types of mining algorithms: 1)
algorithms that use candidate generation (e.g., in [1]) and
2) algorithms that do not use candidate generation [8].
We expect our log size to grow up to several million
entries (e.g., around 2,500,000 entries correspond to the
stakeholder’s annual system logs). Based on benchmark
results of the FIMI workshop [6], we choose to use an
algorithm that does not use candidate generation to comply
with the scalability and speed requirements.
Selection of interesting events based on absolute sup-
port count To distinguish between interesting and unin-
teresting itemsets, algorithms use the concept of “cut off”
parameter. For example, some algorithms use absolute min-
imum support count (e.g., consider an itemset frequent if it
appears at least 5 times in the dataset) while others use the
relative minimum support (e.g., take itemsets which appear
in 10% of total dataset entries). Some algorithms use top k
ranking of patterns (e.g., extract top 5 ranked patterns). In
our context, the output of the algorithm is then inspected by
security experts. Thus, to improve the usability, we decide to
use an algorithm which implements absolute support count
and ranking. We determine the final “cut off” parameter with
stakeholders (discussed in Section VI).
An algorithm that meets most of our requirements is
presented by Grahne et al. [7].
Implementation: We have implemented a prototype of
MELISSA using Java. Data aggregation operations gather
and summarize data for easier analysis. We transform the
Timestamp attribute to represent usual working shifts in
the company. This way we aggregate a timeseries attribute
into a 3-value discrete format that is more suitable for
mining workload patterns. In our case, “working shift 1”
covers all events occurring between 00:00 and 08:59hrs.
“Working shift 2” includes events occurring between 09:00
and 16:59hrs. “Working shift 3” includes events occurring
between 17:00 and 23:59hrs.
Also, we aggregate the attribute Object path. This at-
tribute is in the format of structured text and represents a
hierarchical tree of locations in the plant (both functional
and geographical). In practice, the values of this attribute
represent the “address path” of a device where the event has
taken place or, in case of a configuration change, the system
path of the change. The last substring of the path represents
the name of a device (e.g., plant1/street1/pumps/pump3).
To aggregate values, we take the substring of the tree path
with up to and excluding the leaves of the tree. This way
we semantically group together devices which are on the
same location (or configuration paths) and thus aggregate
the original attribute from 170 down to 36 nominal values.
Finally, for all nominal attributes in the dataset we code
distinct numerical values as our algorithm only accepts
numerical values.
In the Pattern Engine we use an algorithm for mining
maximal frequent patterns proposed in [7]. We then use
severity weights for the fine-grained re-ordering of patterns.
The severity weights are derived from the ranking that
is compiled by the stakeholders. For this, we asked the
stakeholders to select a set of attributes. The stakeholders
selected three attributes: Type of action, SCADA node and
Aspect of action and compiled the ranking of the values for
each attribute (e.g., for attribute Type of action: 1. Aspect-
Directory, 2. Network message, 3. Operation, etc. Here, the
order of the value implies how severe is that specific type
of action for the process). We run several experiments to
generate different PE outputs using the selected attributes,
and then submitted the results to the stakeholders. The
stakeholders selected the attribute Type of action as the one
whose ranking performed the most useful results within the
extracted patterns. Thus we perform the final fine-grained
re-ordering based on the severity weights of this attribute.
VI. BENCHMARKS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach we collected
a dataset of logs generated by the SCADA system of the
stakeholders, which processes waste, surface and drinking
water. The 101,025 log entries were collected during a
14 day period, and each log entry consists of at most 12
attributes. The logs were captured with the default audit set
up of the SCADA system that collects events continuously
through time.
We use the subset of 6 log attributes that consist of 69
unique items. Since we aim at identifying the least frequent
patterns, our minimal support count is 1. This means that
each unique event which occurred at least once represents a
pattern.
Testing MELISSA: At the time of logging, there were
no known security incidents in the log. Therefore, lacking
the notion of ground truth, we can not perform the typical
detector validation. Nevertheless, the goal of the testing is
to see if we can detect unexpected (but security interesting)
user actions from real data. To keep the data clean and
realistic, we thus choose not to add synthetic entries to the
log.
As a proof of concept, we run our analysis in offline
mode. This means that a user runs a “day after” analysis.
For example, each day the user receives up to 20 least
frequent events from the day before (normally, in the stake-
holder’s facility under analysis, a user gets approximately
7,000 unclassified events per day, so a reduction to 20 is
significant). This approach can detect silent mimicry attacks
as operators have a daily overview of events and can spot
unusually infrequent user actions spread over a long period
of time (e.g., unplanned configuration changes [18]). The
disadvantage is that the system does not use summarized
knowledge of past behaviour (i.e., the “knowledge window”
is 1 day).
We decide to run the analysis offline because:
 we were provided with only two weeks of system logs;
 we cannot claim that these two weeks represent a
complete set of behaviours that occur in the facility
through a year;
 water-related systems are considered as slow processes
(the consequences of actions are delayed - e.g., it takes
Figure 5. MELISSA testing, output of the day 4
several hours to overload a tank even while pumping at
maximum speed), thus we can afford to run the analysis
with a delay.
MELISSA found 486 unique patterns from the 14 days
long SCADA log. The number of unique patterns per day
varies from 12 to 79. Also, the support count per day per
pattern varies from 1 to 1,151. According to our stakehold-
ers, an acceptable level of usability is that they receive up to
20 events per day for manual inspection, with the exception
that all events with a support count of 1 should be reported.
We use these requirements to set the threshold for extracting
the most interesting events.
We first summarize the results after 14 days of inspection.
After applying the threshold on the whole dataset, approxi-
mately 198 events (represented in 131 patterns) are labeled
for inspection. During the daily inspections, the stakeholders
label 20 patterns as suspicious. After having collected addi-
tional information about the context, the stakeholders finally
label 3 patterns as anomalous. These 3 patterns occur in 5
events.
We now describe the context of the patterns which were
labelled as anomalous. All anomalous patterns occur on
day 4. Figure 5 represents a projection of the pattern
analysis from this day. The table consists of 8 columns.
The first column represents the final PE output value for
the specific pattern (the value is a combination of pattern
support and severity weight). The second column represents
the pattern support count. The remaining columns represent
the attributes used in the analysis. The wavy horizontal line
represents the border between interesting and uninteresting
patterns as decided by the stakeholders (maximum 20 events
per day). On the righthand side of table, the stakeholders la-
beled each pattern as either normal or anomalous (A1. . .A3).
For anomalous patterns, circles imply why the pattern is
unusual.
Anomalous pattern A1 occurred only once (support count
is 1). Node EN03 represents an engineering workstation.
Shift 1 represents the night shift. For the stakeholders A1
is anomalous because engineers are expected to work only
Table III
MELISSA RESULTS: SIZE OF INPUT LOGS, SIZE OF TOOL OUTPUT,
NUMBER OF FIRST AND SECOND STAKEHOLDERS’ INSPECTION
Full log Forinspection Suspicious Anomalous
number of
events 101,025 198 23 5
number of
patterns 486 131 20 3
during day shifts. Inspecting the complete log we found
that, except this event, all activities performed by engineers
or on engineering workstations did occur during day shifts
only. After a thorough internal inspection, the stakeholders
found a software emulator with a faulty automation script
that remotely attempted to connect to the EN03 engineering
workstation. This entry represents a trace of a scripting error
by an engineer (thus an operational mistake) which could
have effect on system performance, as other actions could
depend on it.
Anomalous patterns A2 and A3 occur twice. Node CS01
represents the primary Connectivity Server. Network mes-
sage item typically reports problems in the network commu-
nications. Operation item reports negative system responses
to a user action (such as input expression error messages).
The stakeholders evaluate patterns A2 and A3 as anomalous
because these patterns reflect network and operational errors
on the main connection backbone node (CS01). After a
thorough internal inspection, the stakeholders found out that
all events from these two patterns occurred in the same
minute of day 4. User Engineer 1 was logged in on CS01
during the time these errors happened. The stakeholders
assume that Engineer 1 inserted a value which triggered
an overflow in a device cache, which in turn generated an
error report from the system. We verify that this is the only
case, over two weeks of operations, that error messages
were triggered on Connectivity Servers. The stakeholders
classify these patterns as misconfiguration threats where user
triggered cache overflows by inserting unexpected values.
Usability: Table III summarizes the output of the
performed log analysis through different phases. To inspect
system behaviour in a currently running SCADA system,
the users would have to look at individual events (a few
thousand per day). By transferring the level of analysis to
patterns, instead of individual events, we help stakeholders
in aggregating log information. To discard a large number of
uninteresting patterns, we perform frequency pattern analy-
sis. With the suggested “cut off” threshold, our stakeholders
receive for inspection 131 unique patterns in 14 days. The
number of patterns per day varies, but on average it less than
10. Finally, after context analysis of suspicious patterns (i.e.,
an additional round of analyses), we estimate that the user
had to inspect in average 11 patterns per day.
System performance: Testing has been performed on a
machine with an Intel Core 2 CPU at 2.4GHz and 2Gb of
Table IV
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ESTIMATION OF PROCESSING
ANNUAL LOGS
Dataset
information
SCADA
log “Accidents”
Estimated
annual
SCADA logs
number of instances 101,025 1,000,000 2,500,000
total number of items 69 500 70
avg size of itemsets 6 45 6
Data Preparator (s) 22.7 does not apply 1,080
Pattern mining (s) 0.97 100 200
Total MELISSA
processing time (s) 23.6 does not apply 1,280
memory. Table IV shows runtime results of testing. The table
consists of three columns. The first column shows the results
of our testing on SCADA system logs. The second column
shows benchmark results of the pattern mining algorithm by
Grahne et al. [7] on the “Accidents” dataset [11]. We use
these results to estimate the runtime of the expected size of
system logs over a year time (shown in the third column).
The complexity of the preprocessing is O(n). Scalability
of the used mining frequent patterns algorithm (in PE) is
discussed in [7]. To estimate MELISSA’s performances on
an annual SCADA log, we consider benchmarks of the
pattern mining algorithm of [7] on the “Accidents” dataset.
We argue that this dataset is more complex than the dataset
we use, due to the higher number of attributes. Thus, we
take the results from [7] as our worst case.
To summarize, we estimate that our tool would preprocess
and mine patterns in size of approximately one year of work
in the stakeholder facility in around 22 minutes.
VII. RELATED WORK
To detect anomalous behaviour in SCADA systems, au-
thors use approaches based on inspecting network traffic
[2] validating protocol specifications [4] and analysing data
readings [13]. Process-related attacks typically cannot be de-
tected by observing network traffic or protocol specifications
in the system. We argue that to detect such attacks one needs
to analyse data passing through the system [2][5] and include
a semantic understanding of user actions. Bigham et al. [5]
use periodical snapshots of power load readings in a power
grid system to detect if a specific load snapshot significantly
varies from expected proportions. This approach is efficient
because it reflects the situation in the process in a case of an
attack. However, data readings (such as power loads) give
a low-level view on the process and do not provide user
traceability data.
Several researches explore pattern mining of various logs
for security purposes (e.g., alarm logs in [10][14], system
calls in [12], event logs in [9]). These authors use pattern
mining on burst of alarms to build episode rules. However,
pattern mining can sometimes produce irrelevant and re-
dundant patterns, as shown in [10]. We use pattern mining
algorithms to extract the most and the least frequent event
patterns from SCADA log.
To the best of our knowledge, only Balducelli et al. [2]
analyse SCADA logs to detect unusual behaviour. There,
the authors use case-base reasoning to find sequences of
events that do not match sequences of normal behaviour
(from the database of known cases). The authors analyse
sequences of log events that originate from a simulated
testbed environment. In contrast, we analyse individual logs
from a real SCADA facility.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We analyse process-related threats that occur in the com-
puter systems used in critical infrastructures. Such threats
take place when an attacker manages to gain valid user
credentials and performs actions to alter/disrupt a targeted
industrial process, or when a legitimate user makes an
operational mistake and causes a process failure.
Currently no control (e.g., monitoring tools) is available
to mitigate process-related threats. To detect process-related
threats, logs could be analysed. These logs hold critical
information for incident identification, such as user activ-
ities and process status. However, system logs are rarely
processed due to 1) the large number of entries generated
daily by systems and 2) a general lack of the security skills
and resources (time).
We propose an analysis tool that extracts non-frequent
patterns, which are expected to be the result of an anomalous
events such a undesirable user actions. We benchmarked the
tool with real logs from a water treatment facility. Although
no real security incident occurred in the log we took into
account, at least five events were labelled by the stakeholders
as anomalous. A limitation of our approach is that the
attacker could evade the detection by repeating the same
command a number of times. We plan to address this lim-
itation by increasing the “knowledge window” for learning
common relations between the frequencies of performed
actions for a longer period of time. Also, as future work,
we plan to expand our tool to address anomalous sequences
of actions, rather than single events/operations.
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